


Secure Communication over MQTT



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Why Security?

- “Our data does not have commercial value”
- “There is no incentive for hackers to attack our systems”
- “I don’t bank online, I don’t store sensitive information on my machine! I only use it to check email →
What could hackers possibly want from this machine?”
- A compromised system has value as:
 - Zombie (spam, DoS, CAPTCHA solver)
 - Server (phishing, malware, forbidden/explicit content)
 - Credentials (e-mail, accounts, banking, Twitter, Skype)
 - Many more...

Why Security?

- Modern attacks are auto coordinated.
- No distinction is made about the qualification of victim.

“Mirai” DDoS Attack from IoT Devices(2016)

- DDoS attack of 620Gbps (record volume at the time)
- **Originating from:**
 - IP security cameras
 - DVRs
 - Routers, set top box etc.
- All had inferior protection:
 - Open telnet ports,
 - Default / weak passwords
 - etc.
- Current record: 1.3Tbps (2x BluRay / sec)
- Search: Wikipedia “Mirai (malware)”, “Linux.Darll0z” etc.

Threats to MQTT Communication

- Compromised devices (key / password / certificate theft)
- Data in clients and brokers become accessible
- Comms: Intercepted, altered, re-routed or disclosed
- Injection of spoofed control packets, false packets
- Denial of Service (DoS) attack bot

How to Prevent

- Authentication of devices (and users)
- Authorization of access to server resources
- Control and payload packets:
 - Integrity
 - Privacy
- Transport encryption
- Payload encryption
- Physical protection (read protect, mechanical, etc.)

Security Features of MQTT


- MQTT is only a message transport protocol.
- Only basic security:
Username/Password
(sent without encryption...)
- User must provide message authentication/encryption.
- Transport Level Security (TLS)
is the most common security method.

Authentication / Encryption

- **Authentication:** Proof that the content
 - Comes from the original source and
 - Was unaltered.
- **Encryption:** The content cannot be viewed by others during transport.

Simple Authentication


- Username and password sent by the client and authenticated by broker.
- Credentials sent openly (!)



- Transport protocol encryption is needed.

Public Key Cryptography

- Traditionally keys are “symmetric”
 - The key to lock, also unlocks.
- Client can encrypt a message and send, but a copy of the key must be delivered.
 - How can a message be encrypted without delivering the key?
- Public key cryptography.
 - The lock and unlock keys are different.




Distributed Decision of a Secret Key

- Use modulo functions. $f(b, x) = b^x \mid p = y$
- Where b, p are constants.
- Use the equality:
$$f(b, k) = l, \quad f(b, m) = n$$
$$f(n, k) = f(l, m) = z$$

Distributed Decision of a Secret Key

- Public information: $b=3$, $p=17$
- Nodes A, B each generate a random number, hash and exchange publicly.
- Each can generate the same crypto key.
- Eavesdroppers cannot compute 10 from $3, 17, 7, 10$.

	A	B
Random	43	51
Hashed	$f(3, 43)=7$	$f(3, 51)=10$
Secret	$f(10, 43)=3$	$f(7, 51)=3$



Public Key Cryptography


- Each lock has complementary keys.
- If one is **used to lock**, the **other must be used to unlock**.
- One key is guarded: **Secret key**
- The other key is publicly disclosed: **Public key**

- 3rd parties can lock with the public key →
Only key owner can open with guarded key: **Secrecy**

- Owner can lock with secret key →
3rd parties can unlock: **Authentication**


Public Key Cryptography

1. Client retrieves openly announced **public key**.
2. Client **encrypts** the message with the public key.
3. Message is transported in public network.
4. Server **decrypts** the message using **secret key**.




Encryption

- It can protect from eavesdroppers →
- Encryption by public key can only be decrypted using the secret key.




Encryption

- How about **man-in-the-middle** attacks?



Authorized Certificates

- Certificate Authority (CA) is a **legal entity**.
- Approves legitimacy of server.
- Encrypts server certificate with “**holy key**”



TLS Messaging Mechanism


- Transport Layer Security:
 - Messages are encrypted
 - Authentication is performed.
- It is possible both to:
 - Ensure authenticity
 - Prevent content theft

TLS Messaging Mechanism

- Handshake: Agree on crypto algorithms.
- Authenticate; each other by digital certificates.
- Generate; shared secret key using asymmetric encryption specifically **for this session**.
- Further communications are encrypted with shared secret key.

TLS Messaging Mechanism

- Transport Layer Security



TLS Messaging Essentials


- The following information must be generated:
- Certificate Authority (CA) certificate (X509)
(provides public key of authority.) **ca.crt**
- Server certificate (signed by the CA secret key)
(Authentication of the server.) **server.crt**
- Server key **server.key**
(For encrypting server messages)

Payload Encryption Only

- Payload data is encrypted at publisher.
- Decrypt at broker OR,
- Decrypt at subscriber.
- Meta-data is intact NOT encrypted:
 - topic, password, username (routing, QoS etc.)
- Payload authenticity can be verified.
- Broker cannot access payload.
- Only qualified subscribers may access payload.
- How to secure the encryption keys?


Payload Encryption: End to End

- Qualified subscribers can decrypt.
- How to keep keys safe?



Payload Encryption: Publisher to Broker

- Encryption publisher → broker
- Simpler key management: Only publishers and broker



MQTT TLS example - Certificates

- We will use “openssl” package.
- CA certificate. (We will sign our own certificates)
`openssl req -new -x509 -days 1000 -extensions v3_ca -keyout ca.key -out ca.crt`
- Server key: `openssl genrsa -out server.key 2048`
- Server certificate request: `openssl req -out server.csr -key server.key -new`
- Sign server certificate: `openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAcreateserial -out server.crt -days 1000`
- The required files are highlighted.
- “ca.crt” must reside in the client to authenticate server.
- “server.crt”, “server.key” must reside in the server.
- Communication will be encrypted.

MQTT TLS example - Broker Setup

- **Start broker:**

`mosquitto -c mosquitto.conf :`

`mosquitto.conf:`

```
port 8883
cafile /etc/mosquitto/ca_certificates/ca.crt
certfile /etc/mosquitto/certs/server.crt
keyfile /etc/mosquitto/certs/server.key
```

- **Subscribe:**

`mosquitto_sub -h 192.168.142.84 -t house --cafile ca.crt
-p 8883 --tls-version tlsv1`

- **Publish:**

`mosquitto_pub -h 192.168.142.84 -t house --cafile ca.crt -m "testing"
-p 8883`

- **Unencrypted subscribe/publish requests are not honored.**

Physical protection

- System is deployed at some remote location, open to the elements.
- By definition, all of the information required to achieve communication is within the device.
- The information must be physically protected using code locking, physical protection etc.

Contact Information

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Kerbs security DDoS attack URL

- <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/>